We study dynamic changes of agents' observational power in logics of knowledge and time. We consider CTL * K, the extension of CTL * with knowledge operators, and enrich it with a new operator that models a change in an agent's way of observing the system. We extend the classic semantics of knowledge for perfect-recall agents to account for changes of observation, and we show that this new operator strictly increases the expressivity of CTL * K. We reduce the modelchecking problem for our logic to that for CTL * K, which is known to be decidable. This provides a solution to the model-checking problem for our logic, but its complexity is not optimal. Indeed we provide a direct decision procedure with better complexity.
Introduction
In multi-agent systems, agents usually have only partial information about the state of the system [23] . This has led to the development of epistemic logics, often combined with temporal logics, for describing and reasoning about how distributed systems and agents' knowledge evolve over time. Such formalisms have been applied to the modelling and analysis of, e.g., distributed protocols [18, 12] , information flow and cryptographic protocols [26, 13] and knowledge-based programs [27] . In these frameworks, an agent's view of a particular state of the system is given by an observation of that state. In all the cited settings, an agent's observation of a given state does not change over time. In other words, these frameworks have no primitive for reasoning about agents whose observation power can change. Because this phenomenon occurs in real scenarios, for instance when a user of a system is granted access to previously hidden data, we propose here to tackle this problem. Precisely, we extend classic epistemic temporal logics with a new unary operator, ∆ o , that represents changes of observation power, and is read "the agent changes her observation power to o". For instance, the formula ∆ o1 AF (∆ o2 (K p ∨ K ¬p)) expresses that "For an agent with initial observation power o 1 , in all possible futures there exists a point where, if the agent updates her observation power to o 2 , she learns whether or not the proposition p holds". If in this example o 1 and o 2 represent different "security levels" and p is sensitive information, then the formula expresses a possible avenue for attack. The logics and model-checking procedures that we present in this paper allow the expression and evaluation of such properties. Another motivation for studying such logics comes from the recently introduced Strategy Logic with Imperfect Information [6] , an extension of Strategy Logic [19] in which agents can dynamically change observation power when changing strategies.
There is a rich history of epistemic logic in AI, including the static and temporal settings [12] , the dynamic setting [28] as well as the strategic setting [23] . The most common logics of knowledge and time are CTLK, LTLK and CTL * K, which extend the classic temporal logics CTL, LTL and CTL * with epistemic operators. These logics have been studied for two main recall abilities: no memory or perfect recall. For memoryless agents, adapting the semantics of these logics to include the observation-change operator is straightforward. Modelchecking algorithms also can be easily adapted by keeping updated in the procedure each agent's current observation, and this information is of linear size. The resulting logics thus have a Pspace-complete model-checking problem, as LTLK, CTLK and CTL * K do [21, 16] .
The case of agents with perfect recall, which we study in this work, is more delicate. The model-checking problem for LTLK and CTL * K is nonelementary decidable [25, 8, 1] , with k-Exptime upper-bound for formulas with at most k nested knowledge operators. The same upper-bounds are known for CTLK [10] . In this work we show that, as for the memoryless semantics, the introduction of observation changes in epistemic temporal logics with perfect recall does not increase the complexity of the model-checking problem. We extend CTL * K (which subsumes CTLK and LTLK) with observation-change operators ∆ o , starting with the single-agent case, and we solve its model-checking problem. To do so we define an alternative semantics which, unlike the natural one, is based on a bounded amount of information. Once the two semantics proven to be equivalent, designing a modelchecking algorithm is almost straightforward. We then extend the logic to the multi-agent case, introducing operators ∆ o a for each agent a, and we extend our approach to solve its model-checking problem. Next, we study the expressivity of our logic, showing that the observation-change operator increases expressivity. We finally provide a reduction to CTL * K which shows how to remove observation-change operators, at the cost of a blow-up in the size of the model. Our direct model-checking procedure is shown to have a better complexity than going through this reduction and using known model-checking algorithms for CTL * K.
Definition 1 (Syntax).
The sets of history formulas ϕ and path formulas ψ are defined by the following grammar:
where p ∈ AP and o ∈ O.
We call CTL * K∆ formulas all history formulas so defined. Operators X and U are the classic next and until operators of temporal logics, and A is the universal path quantifier from branching-time temporal logics. K is the knowledge operator from epistemic logics, and K ϕ reads as "the agent knows that ϕ is true". Our new observation change operator, ∆ o , reads as "the agent now observes the system with observation o".
As usual, we define = p ∨ ¬p, ϕ ∨ ϕ = ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ), ϕ → ϕ = ¬ϕ ∨ ϕ , as well as the temporal operators finally (F ) and always (G): F ϕ = U ϕ, and Gϕ = ¬F ¬ϕ.
Semantics
The models of CTL * K∆ are Kripke structures equipped with one observation relation ∼ o on states for each observation o.
Definition 2 (Models).
A Kripke structure with observations is given as a structure
, where AP ⊂ AP is a finite subset of atomic propositions, S is a set of states, [25] ), that map states to atomic observations, and where two states are indistinguishable for an observation function if they have the same image. Another consists in seeing states as tuples of local states, one for each agent, two global states being indistinguishable for an agent if her local state is the same in both (see, e.g., [16] ). All these formalisms are essentially equivalent with respect to epistemic temporal logics [20] . In these alternative formalisms, observation change would correspond to, respectively, changing observation function, and changing local states in global states. Note that the formalism via local states, because indistinguishability is hard-coded in states of the system, is less adapted to the modelling of observation change.
Observation records.
To define which histories the agent cannot distinguish, we need to keep track of how she observed the system at each point in time. To do so, we record each observation change as a pair (o, n), where o is the new observation and n is the time when this change occurs.
Definition 3.
An observation record is a finite word over O × N.
Note that observation records are meant to represent changes of observational ability, and thus they do not contain the initial observation (which is given in the model). We write ∅ for the empty observation record. ι . The observation record shows that at time 0, thus before the first transition, the agent changed for observation o 1 . She then observed state s 0 again, but this time with observation o 1 . Then the system goes through states s 1 and s 2 and reaches s 3 , all of which she observes with observation o 1 . At time 3, the agent changes to observation o 2 , and thus observes state s 3 again, but this time with observation o 2 , and finally she switches to observation o 3 and thus observes s 3 once more, with observation o 3 . Finally, the system goes to state s 4 , which the agent observes with observation o 3 .
We write r·(o, n) for the observation record obtained by appending (o, n) to the observation record r, and r[n] for the record consisting of all pairs (o, m) in r such that m = n. We say that an observation record r stops at n if r[m] is empty for all m > n, and r stops at history h if it stops at |h| − 1. Unless otherwise specified, when we consider an observation record r together with a history h, it is understood that r stops at h.
Observations at time n. We let ol(r, n) be the list of observations used by the agent at time n. It consists of the observation that the agent has when the n-th transition is taken, plus those of observation changes that occur before the next transition. It is defined by induction on n:
, and
Observe that ol(r, n) is never empty: if no observation change occurs at time n, ol(r, n) only contains the last observation taken by the agent. If r is empty, the latter is the initial observation o ι defined by the model.
Synchronous perfect recall. The usual definition of synchronous perfect recall states that for an agent with observation o, histories h and h are indistinguishable if they have the same length and are point-wise indistinguishable, i.e., |h| = |h | and for each i < |h|,
We adapt this definition to changing observations: two histories are indistinguishable if, at each point in time, the states are indistinguishable for all observations used at that time.
Definition 6 (Dynamic synchronous perfect recall). Given an observation record r, two histories h and h are equivalent, written h ≈ r h , if
We now define the natural semantics of CTL * K∆.
Definition 7 (Natural semantics). Fix a model M . A history formula ϕ is evaluated in a history h and an observation record r. A path formula ψ is interpreted on a run π, a point in time n ∈ N and an observation record. The semantics is defined by induction on formulas:
We say that a model M with initial state s ι satisfies a CTL
We first discuss a subtlety of our semantics, which is that an agent can observe the same state consecutively with several observations.
Remark. Consider the formula ∆
Note that although the history did not change (it is still h), the observation record is extended by the observation o at time |h| − 1, with the following consequence. Suppose that ol(r, |h| − 1) = o. After switching to o , the agent considers possible all histories h such that i) h ∼ r h (they were considered possible before the change of observation) and ii) last(h) ∼ o last(h ) (they are still considered possible after the change of observation). Informally this means that by changing observation from o to o , the agent's information is further refined by o , and it is as though the agent at time |h| − 1 observed the system with observation o ∩ o . At later times, her observation is simply o , until another change of observation occurs.
Examples of observation change
Example 8. A logic of accumulative knowledge (and resource bounds) is introduced in [15] . It studies agents that can perform successive observations to improve their knowledge of [15] shows how to model a medical diagnosis in which the disease is narrowed down by performing a series of successive tests.
Our logic is incomparable with the one discussed in the previous example, in which observations have a cost, but no temporal aspect is considered. In this work we do not consider costs, but we study the evolution of knowledge through time in addition to dynamic observation change. We now illustrate with an example how both interact.
Example 9 (Security scenario). Consider a system with two possible levels of security clearance, which define what information users have access to, and are modelled by observations o 1 and o 2 . In this scenario, we want to hide a secret p from the users. A desirable property is thus expressed by the formula (
, which means that a user using either o 1 or o 2 will never know that p holds. Model M from Figure 1 satisfies this formula. Now consider the formula ϕ = ∆ o1 EF ∆ o2 K p, which means that if the user starts with observation o 1 , there exists a moment where she might discover the secret by changing her observation. We show that M satisfies ϕ and thus that it should forbid users to change their security level. Consider the history h = s 0 s 2 s 5 in model M with initial observation o 1 . At time 0 the user knows that the system is in state s 0 . After going to s 2 , she does not know if the current state is s 2 or s 1 , as they are indistinguishable using o 1 . At time 2, at first the user does not know whether the system is in s 4 or s 5 . Even though s 6 and s 5 are indistinguishable with o 1 , she does not consider s 6 possible, as she remembers that the system was not in s 3 before. Now, if she changes to observation o 2 , she sees that the system is either in state s 5 or s 6 . Refining her previous knowledge that the system is either in state s 4 or s 5 , she deduces that the current state is s 5 , and that p holds.
Example 10 (Fault-Tolerant Diagnosability). Diagnosability is a property of systems in which the occurrence of a failure is always eventually detected [22] . In the setting considered in [7] , a diagnosability condition is a pair (c 1 , c 2 ) of nonempty disjoint sets of states that the system should always be able to tell apart. The system is monitored through a set of sensors, and they study the problem of finding minimal sets of sensors that ensure diagnosability. That is, find a minimal sensor configuration sc such that ∆ osc AG(K c 1 ∨ K c 2 ) holds, where o sc is the observation corresponding to sensor configuration sc.
In CTL * K∆ one can express and model-check a stronger notion of diagnosability that we call fault-tolerant diagnosability, where the system must remain diagnosable even after the loss of a sensor. For a given diagnosability condition (c 1 , c 2 ) and sensor configuration sc, we write o sc the original observation (with every sensor in sc), o i the observation where sensor i failed, and p i is a proposition indicating the failure of sensor i. The following formula expresses that sensor configuration sc ensures fault-tolerant diagnosability of the system:
Observe that it is possible for a system to satisfy
if sensor i, before failing, brings some piece of information that is crucial for diagnosis.
Model-checking problem
We are interested in the model checking-problem for CTL * K∆ which consists in, given a model M and a formula ϕ, deciding whether M |= ϕ.
Model-checking approach. Perfect-recall semantics refers to histories of unbounded length, but it is well known that in many situations it is possible to maintain a bounded amount of information that is sufficient to deal with perfect recall. We show that it is also the case for our logic, by generalising the classic approach to take into account observation change. Intuitively, it is enough to know the current state, the current observation and the set of states that the agent believes the system might be in. The latter is usually called information set in epistemic temporal logics and games with imperfect information. We define an alternative semantics based on information sets instead of histories and records, and we prove that this semantics is equivalent to the natural one presented in this section. Because information sets are of bounded size, it is then easy to build from this alternative semantics a model checking algorithm for CTL * K∆.
Alternative semantics
We define an alternative semantics for CTL * K∆. It is based on information sets, a classic notion in games with imperfect information [29] , whose definition we now adapt to our setting.
Definition 11 (Information sets). Given a model M , the information set I(h, r) after a history h and an observation record r is defined as follows:
This information is sufficient to evaluate epistemic formulas for one agent when we consider the S5 semantics of knowledge, i.e., when indistinguishability relations are equivalence relations as is the case here. We now describe how this information can be maintained along the evaluation of a formula. To do so, we define two update functions for information sets. One is used when the agent changes of observational power, and the other when a transition is taken in the model.
Definition 12 (Information set updates). Fix a model
These updates read as follows. When the agent has observational power o and information set I, and the model takes a transition to a state s , the new information set is U T (I, s , o) , which consists of all successors of her previous information set I that are ∼ o -indistinguishable with the new state s . When the agent is in state s with information set I, and she changes for observational power o , her new information set is U ∆ (I, s, o ) , i.e., all states that she considered possible before and that she still considers possible after switching to o .
We let O(h, r) be the last observation taken by the agent after history h, according to r.
The following result establishes that the functions U ∆ and U T correctly update information sets. It is proved by simple application of the definitions.
Proposition 13. For every history h · s, every observation record r that stops at h, and every observation o, it holds that
Using these update functions we can now define our alternative semantics for CTL * K∆.
Definition 14 (Alternative semantics). Fix a model M .
A history formula ϕ is evaluated in a state s, an information set I and an observation o. A path formula ψ is interpreted on a run π, an information set I and an observation o. The semantic relation |= I is defined by induction on formulas:
is the iteration of the temporal update, defined inductively as follows:
Using Proposition 13, one can prove that the natural semantics |= and the information semantics |= I are equivalent (the proof is in Appendix A). 
Theorem 15. For every history formula ϕ, model M , history h and observation record r that stops at h, h, r |= ϕ iff last(h), I(h, r), o(h, r) |=
We To model check a formula ϕ in a model M , we first buildM , and call function
Example 17. Let M be the model depicted in Fig. 2 , where o 1 is the blind observation (∼ o1 = S × S), o 2 is the perfect observation (s ∼ o2 s iff s = s ), s 1 is the initial state and the agent is initially blind (the initial observation is o 1 ). Note that we did not represent indistinguishability relations o 1 and o 2 . The augmented modelM is depicted in Fig. 3 , where we only drew relevant states, i.e. those that are reachable from the initial state via transitions and observation changes.
Consider formula ϕ = ∆ o2 (K q ∨ ∆ o1 KAX q) which means that if the agent changes to the perfect observation, then either the agent knows that q holds, or even after switching back to the blind observation she knows that in every possible next step, q holds. After running the algorithm, we get the following valuation forM : 
5

Multi-agent setting
We now extend CTL * K∆ to the multi-agent setting. We fix Ag = {a 1 , . . . , a m } a finite set of agents and define the logic CTL * K∆ m . This logic contains, for each agent a and observation o, an operator ∆ o a which reads as "agent a changes for observation o". We consider that these observation changes are public in the sense that all agents are aware of them. The reason is that if agent a changes observation without agent b knowing it, agent b may entertain false beliefs about what agent a knows. This would not be consistent with the S5 semantics of knowledge that we consider in this work, where false beliefs are ruled out by the Truth axiom K ϕ → ϕ.
Syntax and natural semantics
We first extend the syntax, with knowledge operators K a and observation change operators ∆ o a for each agent.
Definition 18 (Syntax).
where p ∈ AP, a ∈ Ag and o ∈ O.
Formulas of CTL
* K∆ m are all history formulas. 
Definition 19 (Multiagent models). A multiagent Kripke structure with observations is given by a structure M = (AP, S, T, V, {∼
AP ⊂ AP is a finite subset of atomic propositions, S is a set of states, T ⊆ S × S is a left-total transition relation between states, V : S → 2 AP is a valuation function, We now adapt some definitions to the multi-agent setting.
Records tuples. We now need one observation record for each agent. We shall write r for a tuple {r a } a∈Ag . Given a tuple r = {r a } a∈Ag and a ∈ Ag we write r a for r a , and for an observation o and time n we let r · (o, n) a be the record tuple r where r a is replaced with r a · (o, n). Finally, for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, r i refers to r ai .
Observations at time n. We let ol a (r, n) be the list of observations used by agent a at time n:
Definition 20 (Dynamic synchronous perfect recall). Given a record tuple r, two histories h and h are equivalent for agent a, written h ≈ 
Definition 21 (Natural semantics).
Let M be a model, h a history in M and r a record tuple. We only define the semantics for the following inductive cases, the remaining ones are straightforwardly adapted from the one-agent case (Definition 7).
where ∅ is the tuple where each agent has empty observation record.
Alternative semantics
As in the one-agent case, we define an alternative semantics that we prove equivalent to the natural one and upon which we build our model-checking algorithm. The main difference here is that we need richer structures than information sets to represent an epistemic situation of a system with multiple agents. For instance, to evaluate formula K a K b K c p, we need to know what agent a knows about agent b's knowledge of agent c's knowledge of the system's state. To do so we use the k-trees introduced in [24, 25] in the setting of static observations, and which contain enough information to evaluate formulas of knowledge depth k.
k-trees. Fix a model M = (AP, S, T, V, {∼
Intuitively, a k-tree over M is a structure of the form s, I 1 , . . . , I m , where s ∈ S is the current state of the system, and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, I i is a set of (k − 1)-trees that represents the state of knowledge (of depth k − 1) of agent a i . Formally, for every history h and record tuple r we define by induction on k the k-tree I k (h, r) as follows:
where for each i,
. . , I m , we call s the root of I k , and write it r(I k ). We also write I k (a) for I i , where a = a i , and we let T k be the set of k-trees for M . Observe that for one agent (i.e. m = 1), a 1-tree is an information set together with the current state.
Updating k-trees. We now generalise our update functions U ∆ and U T (Definition 12) to update k-trees. We first define, by induction on k, the function U k T that updates k-trees when a transition is taken.
where for each i, We now define the second update function U k ∆ , which is used when an agent a i changes observation for some o . 
The intuition is that when agent a i changes observation for o , in every place of the k-tree that refers to agent a i 's knowledge, we remove possible states (and corresponding subtrees) that are no longer equivalent to the current possible state for a i 's new observation o .
We let O(h, r) be the tuple of last observations taken by each agent after history h, according to r. 
The proof can be found in Appendix B.
We now define the alternative semantics for CTL * K∆ m .
Definition 23 (Alternative semantics). The semantics of a history formula ϕ of knowledge depth k is defined inductively on a k-tree I
k and a tuple of current observations o (note that the current state is the root of the k-tree).
where U k T n is the iteration of U k T , defined similarly to the mono-agent case.
The following theorem can be proved similarly to Theorem 15, using Proposition 22 instead of Proposition 13. 
, and 
Algorithm correctness. The correctness of the algorithm follows from the following properties:
For each formula K a ϕ chosen by the algorithm, 
Expressivity
In this section we prove that the observation-change operator adds expressive power to epistemic temporal logics. Formally, we compare the expressive power of CTL * K∆ m with that of CTL * K m [14, 9] , which is the syntactic fragment of CTL * K∆ m obtained by removing the observation-change operator. Our semantics for CTL * K∆ m generalises that of CTL * K m , with which it coincides on CTL * K m formulas. Note that our multi-agent models (Definition 19) are more general than usual models for CTL * K m , as they may contain observation relations that are not initially assigned to any agent, but such relations are mute in the evaluation of
For two logics L and L over the same class of models, we say that
Proof. This simply follows from the fact that CTL * K∆ m extends CTL * K m .
We first point out that when there is only one observation, i.e., |O| = 1, the observationchange operator has no effect, and thus CTL * K∆ m is no more expressive than CTL * K m .
Proposition 27.
Proof. We show that for |O| = 1, CTL * K∆ m CTL * K m , which together with Proposition 26 provides the result. Observe that when |O| = 1, observation change has no effect, and in fact observation records can be omitted in the natural semantics. For every CTL * K∆ m formula ϕ, define the CTL * K m formula ϕ by removing all observation-change operators ∆ o a from ϕ. It is easy to see that ϕ ≡ ϕ .
We now show that as soon as we have at least two observations, the observation-change operator adds expressivity. We first consider the mono-agent case.
Proof. Assume that O contains o 1 and o 2 . Consider the model M from Example 9 (Figure 1) , and define the model M which is the same as M except that s 4 and s 5 are indistinguishable for both o 1 and o 2 , while in M they are only indistinguishable for o 1 (see Figure 4) . In both models, agent a is initially assigned observation o 1 . We exhibit a formula of CTL * K∆ that can distinguish between M and M , and justify that no formula of CTL * K can, which shows that CTL * K∆ CTL * K. 
We now define formula Φ . The transformation tr o is parameterised with an observation o ∈ O and is defined by induction on Φ as follows:
All other cases simply distribute over operators. We finally let Φ = tr
Using the alternative semantics it is rather easy to see that the following holds:
This establishes the correctness of the reduction, and because we know how to model-check CTL * K, provides a model-checking procedure for CTL * K∆. However this algorithm does not provide optimal complexity. Indeed, the model M is of size |M | × |O|, and the best known model-checking algorithm for CTL * K runs in time exponential in the size of the model and the size of the formula [8] . Going through this reduction thus yields a procedure that is exponential in the number of observations. Our direct model-checking procedure, which generalises techniques used for the classic case of static observations, provides instead a decision procedure which is only polynomial in the number of observations (Theorem 16). The reduction described above can be easily generalised to the multi-agent case, by creating one copy M o of the original model M for each possible assignment o of observations to agents. We thus get a model M of size |M | × |O| |Ag| , and since the best known model-checking procedure for CTL * K m is k-exponential in the size of the model [8] , this reduction provides a procedure which is k-exponential in the number of observations and k + 1-exponential in the number of agents. The direct approach provides an algorithm that is only polynomial in the number of observations, exponential in the number of agents, and whose combined complexity is k-exponential time (Theorem 25).
Conclusion and future work
Epistemic temporal logics play a central role in MAS as they permit to describe in an elegant way the knowledge of agents along the evolution of a system. Previous works in this field have treated agents' observation power as a static feature. However, in many real life scenarios, agents' observation power may change along computations.
In this work we introduced CTL * K∆, a logic that can express such dynamic changes of observation power, and we demonstrated how this can be used to express relevant properties in practical scenarios. We studied the model checking of CTL * K∆ over both mono-and multi-agent systems and proved that in both cases, the ability to express observation changes comes at no complexity cost, but strictly increases expressivity. We also showed how to reduce the model-checking problem for our logic to that of CTL * K, removing the observation-change
operator. This provides a model-checking procedure for CTL * K∆, but given the complexity of the best-known model-checking algorithm for CTL * K, this procedure is not as efficient as the direct algorithm we provide.
As future work, we plan to build upon the techniques developed here to investigate epistemic extensions of strategic logics with imperfect information. Several such logics have been defined and studied recently [2, 5, 6, 3, 4] , and [6] in particular already presents the feature of dynamic observation change via change of strategy. We believe that the present work will help to establish new results on the model checking of such logics. 
A Proof of Theorem 15
Theorem 15 directly follows from the following lemma: Let π be a path, n a natural number and r an observation record that stops at n. ψ = ϕ: By definition, π, n, r |= ϕ iff π ≤n , r |= ϕ. By induction hypothesis, the latter is equivalent to last(π ≤n ), I(π ≤n , r), O(π ≤n , r) |= I ϕ. Because (π ≥n ) 0 = last(π ≤n ), by definition this is also equivalent to π ≥n , I(π ≤n , r), O(π ≤n , r) |= I ϕ, which concludes. 
Because π (n+1) = (π ≥n ) 1 , by definition we finally get that π, n, r |= X ψ iff π ≥n , I(π ≤n , r), O(π ≤n , r) |= I X ψ . ψ = ψ 1 U ψ 2 : According to the definitions, it suffices to prove that for all path k ≥ 0 and ψ ∈ {ψ 1 , ψ 2 }, π, n + k, r |= ψ iff π ≥(n+k) , U k T (I(π ≤n , r), π ≥n , O(π ≤n , r)), O(π ≤n , r) |= I ψ. This can be proven by induction on k, using for the inductive step a reasoning similar to that for ψ = X ψ .
B
Proof of Proposition 22
